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Representation of Groups on Petit Juries
The peremptory challenge of prospective jurors is exercised by
prosecutors and defense attorneys without being subject to judicial
approval.' As traditionally understood, the peremptory challenge is
exercisable for any reason, including the group associations of pro-
spective jurors.2 In recent years, criminal defendants in state3 and
federal 4 courts have claimed that prosecutors use peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude racial groups from juries. The courts, however,
have refused to accept the defendants' claims that this practice con-
stitutes a violation of equal protection or due process.3
In Taylor v. Louisiana6 the Supreme Court held that a criminal
1. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). For a general history of the peremptory
challenge, see id. at 212-20; J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 147-51 (1977).
2. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220-21 (1965).
3. See Brown v. State, 248 Ark. 561, 566, 453 S.W.2d 50, 54 (1970); In re Wells, 20 Cal.
App. 3d 640, 64749, 98 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5 (1971); Allen v. State, 231 Ga. 17, 19, 200 S.E.2d
106, 108 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1159 (1974); People v. Butler, 46 Ill. 2d 162, 164-65,
263 N.E.2d 89, 90-91 (1970); State v. Anderson, 315 So. 2d 266, 268 (La. 1975); State v.
Barksdale, 247 La. 198, 218-19, 170 So. 2d 374, 381-82 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 921
(1965); Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 143, 148-51, 262 A.2d 792, 796-97 (1970); Common-
wealth v. Cook, 364 Mass. 767, 770, 308 N.E.2d 508, 510 (1974); People v. Redwine, 50
Mich. App. 593, 595, 213 N.W.2d 841, 842-43 (1973); State v. Smith, 465 S.W.2d 482, 485
(Mo. 1971); State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 483-84, 262 A.2d 868, 871-72, cert. denied, 400
U.S. 949 (1970); State v. Noell, 284 N.C. 670, 681-83, 202 S.E.2d 750, 758-59 (1974), modified,
428 U.S. 902 (1976); Commonwealth v. Darden, 441 Pa. 41, 51, 271 A.2d 257, 262 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971); Johnson v. State, 456 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tenn. Grim. App.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 997 (1971); Reese v. State, 481 SV.2d 841, 842 (Tex. Grim.
App. 1972).
4. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); United States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40,
42-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v. Carter, 528 F.2d 844,
847-50 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Neal, 527 F.2d 63,
65 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Thompson, 518 F.2d 534, 535 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929, 930 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974);
United States v. Grant, 471 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d
207, 208 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1213-18 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nom. United
States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. McDaniels, 379 F. Supp.
1243 (E.D. La. 1974); United States v. Corbitt, 368 F. Supp. 881, 886-88 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1974).
5. See pp. 1722-24 infra and notes 3 & 4 supra (citing cases). In United States v.
McDaniels, 379 F. Supp. 1243 (E.D. La. 1974), Judge Rubin ruled that, while the de-
fendant had failed to show a Fifth Amendment violation, the peremptory challenging of
six blacks by the prosecutor, in that particular trial, resulted in a trial that was "less
than fair." Id. at 1250. In United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976),
Judge Newman held that a pattern of peremptory challenges against blacks called for
the exercise of his supervisory power. Id. at 473. The Second Circuit disagreed as to the
sufficiency of the pattern. United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1977).
See note 36 infra.
6. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
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defendant has a constitutional right to a jury selected from a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community.7 This Note argues that,
when applied to the composition of the jury itself, the rationale be-
hind the holding of Taylor would modify the role of the peremptory
challenge by prohibiting its exercise against prospective jurors on the
basis of their group associations.8 The Note distinguishes between
the group biases of prospective jurors and their "situation-specific"
biases, that is, those relating to the unique aspects of a particular
trial. The Note argues that the proper role of the peremptory is limited
to removal of prospective jurors possessing situation-specific biases.,
Finally, the Note proposes a method of judicial control of the peremp-
tory challenge that is designed to prevent use of the challenge to ex-
clude groups while preserving its potential for the removal of jurors
holding situation-specific biases.
I. The Role of the Peremptory Challenge
Every person accused of a serious crime is entitled to a jury trial.10
The right to be tried by one's peers gives the accused "an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against
the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."" But the mere interposi-
tion of a community body between the defendant and the state does
not necessarily protect the defendant from arbitrary actions or guar-
antee that his case will be fairly adjudicated. The defendant's inter-
7. Id. at 530.
8. For a discussion of the meaning of "group" in this context, see pp. 1735-38 infra.
9. Restricting exercise of the peremptory to removal of jurors holding situation-
specific biases would preserve a role for the peremptory more expansive than that of the
challenge for cause. See pp. 1738-40 and notes 110 & 111 infra.
10. U.S. CONST. amends. VI & XIV; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The
Court in Duncan limited the Sixth Amendment right of trial by jury to "serious offenses,"
as distinguished from "petty offenses." Id. at 157-59.
This Note limits its discussion to the use of peremptory challenges in criminal cases.
The Sixth Amendment analysis of Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), does not
encompass civil juries; but to the extent such analysis can be applied to civil juries under
the Seventh Amendment, the proposal of this Note would be applicable.
11. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S.
356, 367 (1972). Commentators have expressed agreement with the Supreme Court's ap-
praisal of the jury's importance. See, e.g., M. BLOOMISTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM
118-29 (1968); P. DEVLIN, TRIAL By JURY 148-65 (1956); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THe
AMERICAN JURY 492-99 (1966); Clark, The Amnerican Jury: A Justification, I VAL. U.L.
REV. 1 (1966); Kaufman, Harbingers of Jury Reform, 58 A.B.A.J. 695 (1972); Zeisel, The
Waning of the American Jury, 58 A.B.A.J. 367 (1972).
But the jury system has also been the subject of increasing criticism in recent years.
See, e.g., M. GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUsTIcE (1968); Desmond, Juries in Civil Cases-Yes or
No, 36 N.Y. ST. B.J. 104 (1964); Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be Abolished, 60
A.B.A.J. 570 (1974); Harley, Where Jury Trial Fails, 55 JUDICATURE 94 (1971). See also J.
FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-45 (1950).
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Limiting the Peremptory Challenge
ests also require that the jury be impartial: that its verdict be based
on an unbiased consideration of the evidence presented at trial. 12
The venires from which juries are drawn are generally selected
at random from a pool of jurors qualified by statute for jury service. 13
The selection of jurors by a totally random process does not, however,
ensure an impartial jury. Jurors with preconceived notions about
the defendant or about the circumstances of the case threaten the
impartial determination of guilt or innocence.' 4 The questioning
of prospective jurors at voir dire and the subsequent exercise of
challenges provide an opportunity to remove those veniremen who
hold such a situation-specific bias.
The essential features of voir dire are similar in most jurisdictions.
The prospective jurors are told something about the case and the
parties to it, and they are questioned to determine whether any of
them is subject to challenge.' 5 The prosecution and defense are given
the opportunity to object to individual jurors either peremptorily
or for cause. Challenges for cause are subject to approval by the
12. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-73 (1965); Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
722-23 (1961).
13. The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, for example, provides that grand and
petit jury panels be publicly drawn "at random" from the qualified jury list. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1864a (1970). Random selection is also the norm in most state jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 219 (west Supp. 1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1046 (West 1970);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-239 (West 1960); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, §§ 1141-1142 (Purdon
1962) (all providing for drawing of names by lot to form jury panel).
14. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (publication calling witness in
pending case perjurer was, where likely to reach jurors, contempt, because verdict should
be reached only on basis of evidence and argument in court); United States v. Burr, 25 F.
Cas. 49, 50 (D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (Chief Justice John Marshall sitting as trial judge)
(juror having formed opinion on essential part of criminal case was ground for challenge
for cause). See also the view expressed in ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS, STANDARDS RELALTING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 55-56 (Approved draft 1968)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as ABA ADVISORY COM..]:
UJust as we now regard such primitive methods as trial by battle or by ordeal as only
historical curiosities, so we have come to recognize that if guilt is to be a question of
fact and not of rumor, the question must be determined on the basis of evidence
rather than the general sentiment of the community. . . . It is important . . . that
every effort be made to eliminate those jurors whose predispositions are such as to
affect their perceptions and inferences diff6rently in legally similar cases. That is
why attempts to eliminate racial bias in the selection of juries are so essential.
15. See, e.g., FED. R. C~iu'. P. 24(a); N.Y. CRI' r. PROC. LAW § 270.15 (McKinney 1971).
There has been extensive discussion in recent years on the proper extent and content
of questioning at voir dire. For a sampling, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 141-45,
160-66; Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545
(1975); Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 503
(1965); Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should It Be Conducted To Ensure That Our Juries
are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 65 (1976); Note, Exploring
Racial Prejudice on Voir Dire: Constitutional Requirements and Policy Considerations,
54 B.U.L. REV. 394 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Racial Prejudice]; Note, Voir Dire: Estab-
lishing Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27
STAN. L. REV. 1493 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Voir Dire].
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court and must be based on a finding of actual' 6 or implied bias.' 7
Peremptory challenges may be exercised in limited number without
giving reasons and at the sole discretion of the prosecution or defense.' 8
The peremptory enables the defense counsel or the prosecutor to
exercise judgment as to matters of bias which would not ground a
challenge for cause, but which he senses might be prejudicial to his
case.' 9 Historically, the peremptory challenge has protected the de-
16. Challenges for cause based on actual bias require a finding of a prejudiced state
of mind. Because a finding of actual bias depends on the subjective judgment of the
court, the effectiveness of challenges for cause as tools for removing prejudice that is
not expressly admitted by the juror may be limited. See Voir Dire, supra note 15, at
1499-1501.
17. Implied bias is a partiality presumed by law from the existence of certain rela-
tionships or interests of the prospective jurors. Some examples of grounds for implied
bias include a juror's relationship to a party to the litigation, service on a jury which
tried another person for the same offense, pecuniary interest in the outcome, or a
business relationship with the defendant. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1074 (West 1970);
N.Y. CRII. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1971). Most states define by statute the
grounds upon which challenges for cause can be based. Representative of those statutes
is ALl CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 277, reprinted in ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 68-69 (Approved draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as ABA PROJECT].
18. The procedure for the exercise of peremptory challenges is often left to the dis-
cretion of the trial court, although it is occasionally prescribed by statute. The prevailing
state practice has been described as follows:
Twelve veniremen are called and examined, after which the prosecutor exercises
such challenges for cause as may appear and then exercises such peremptories as he
then desires to use. Anyone excused is immediately replaced in the box, so the
prosecutor will tender 12 jurors to the defendant, who likewise exercises challenges
for cause and whatever peremptories he then desires to use. Again those excused are
immediately replaced, and when he is satisfied the defendant tenders the jury tb the
prosecutor. This procedure continues until both parties have exhausted their challenges
or indicate their satisfaction with the jury.
ABA PROJECT, supra note 17, at 77.
An alternative procedure is known as the "struck jury":
The size of the panel at [the beginning of the striking procedure] is the sum of
the number of jurors to hear the case plus the number of peremptories to be allowed
all parties. The parties then proceed to exercise their peremptories, usually al-
ternately or in some similar way which will result in all parties exhausting their
challenges at approximately the same time.
Id. at 77-78. This system is commonly used in the federal courts. See id. at 78.
For examples of statutory procedures, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1069, 1070, 1070.5, 1088
(West 1970) (allowing challenges either as individual jurors are questioned or after jury
box is filled with twelve prospective jurors); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15 (McKinney
1971) (following prevailing state practice except that challenged jurors are replaced after
all challenges to first twelve are made).
In most jurisdictions, the prosecution and the defense are allowed the same number of
peremptories, but in a few instances the defendant has more. The number of challenges
allowed generally increases with the severity of the crime. For a summary of state and
federal practice, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 282-84.
19. It is the position of this Note that the purpose behind the peremptory challenge
is to remove prospective jurors possessing situation-specific biases. It has traditionally
been believed that this purpose is best served by allowing the prosecutor and defense
attorney to challenge peremptorily any juror for any reason, whether or not that reason
is related to a belief in the juror's bias. For example, an attorney may challenge a
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fendant from jurors who appear to be biased against him.20 Similarly,
the provision of peremptories to the prosecution represents a recog-
nition of the state's interest in trial by a jury not unduly biased in
favor of acquittal. 2 1 Each side is presumed to use the two kinds of
challenge to remove those prospective jurors most likely to favor
the other party. This process is expected to eliminate from the jury
both extremes of bias and thus to result in a tribunal as impartial as
could be drawn from the available venire.
22
prospective juror who has a nervous twitch; the attorney may be irritated by people
with twitches. Such uses of the peremptory challenge should not be confused with the
purpose of the peremptory: to eliminate jurors the attorneys believe to be biased with
respect to the case.
20. Blackstone termed the peremptory "a provision full of the tenderness and
humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly famous," and assigned two
reasons for that fact: first, the peremptory guarantees the accused a good opinion of his
jury and thus protects him from trial by anyone he intuitively dislikes, and, second, it
protects the accused from jurors whose resentment has been provoked by questioning at
voir dire. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES "353.
The right of the accused to peremptory challenges does not rise to constitutional
stature. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583,
586 (1919). Professor Babcock, however, offers historical as well as functional arguments
in favor of the constitutional necessity of peremptories. She suggests that the peremptory
is essential to the selection of an impartial jury and that, "quite aside from the impartial
jury guarantee, the peremptory challenge is inherent in the jury trial right itself." Bab-
cock, supra note 15, at 555-56 & n.37.
21. The exercise of peremptories by the prosecution has been the subject of long
debate. The earliest juries were hand-picked by the Crown, which claimed an unlimited
number of peremptory challenges. In 1305, Parliament passed the Ordinance for Inquests,
33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305), providing that if "they that sue for the King will challenge
any ...Jurors, they shall assign . . . a Cause certain," eliminating completely the right
of the King's attorneys to exercise peremptory challenges. The statute was construed,
however, to allow the prosecution to "stand aside" any juror without cause; only if there
were an insufficient number of jurors after the entire panel had been challenged or
passed over did the Crown have to show cause in respect to jurors recalled. This
remains the practice in England. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 147-48.
In early American courts, the provision of peremptory challenges to the defendant was
accepted as part of the common law, but the prosecution's rights were more controversial.
Not until the late nineteenth century did the Supreme Court explicitly recognize the
government's need to challenge jurors peremptorily. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
The government's right to exercise peremptory challenges is now firmly established. See
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (recognizing differences in history of peremp-
tory's provision to accused and prosecution, but noting that system should guarantee
freedom both from bias against accused and from bias against prosecution).
22. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (noting that one function of
peremptory challenge is "to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides"). The
peremptory is thought also to preserve an appearance of impartiality in the judicial
process. The parties and the community are presumably assured that the jurors before
whom the case is tried will decide on the basis of the evidence, not on the basis of
preconceived attitudes. The peremptory, moreover, protects voir dire questioning by
allowing counsel to challenge jurors who may have resented particular questions. Without
that option, counsel might be inhibited unduly in the attempt to elicit evidence of
actual or implied bias. See id. at 219-20.
The effectiveness of the peremptory challenge in removing biased jurors has been
the subject of some controversy and much uncertainty. Some commentators have sug-
gested that peremptories inject bias into the selection process by allowing a party to ob-
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The challenge for cause depends upon the ability of the court or
of the attorneys23 to elicit information at voir dire that identifies
prejudice.24 An increasing awareness of the importance of uncon-
scious bias has directed attention to the peremptory challenge as a
means to eliminate jurors who may unconsciously be predisposed
to conviction or acquittal.25 Because attorneys often have insufficient
tain a jury favorable to his own side. See, e.g., J. VAN DYKE, supra note I, at 139-75;
Imlay, Federal Jury Reformation: Saving A Democratic Institution, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
247, 269-70 (1973); Comment, A Case Study of the Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike
at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 662 (1974); Note, Peremptory
Challenge-Divining Rod for Sympathetic Jury?, 21 CATH. LAw. 56 (1975).
23. There is no single typical method of voir dire examination. FED. R. CRIAI. P.
24(a) leaves considerable discretion to the trial judge to decide whether the court or the
attorneys do the questioning. Federal judges have usually exercised this discretion in
favor of court-conducted voir dire. See Judicial Conf. of the United States, Report of the
Judicial Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, The Jury System in the Federal
Courts, in 26 F.R.D. 409, 466 (1960). As an approximation, 10 states follow the federal
practice; 10 others provide exclusively for questioning by the judge; and 20 provide for
examination by both court and counsel. The remaining states leave the voir dire ques-
tioning to counsel alone. ABA PROJECT, supra note 17, at 63.
24. One difficulty encountered by courts and attorneys attempting to elicit such
information is the inability or unwillingness of jurors to recognize or admit their prej-
udices. See Broeder, supra note 15, at 528. On the basis of personal interviews with 225
jurors serving over a one and one-half year period in a federal district court in the
midwest, Broeder concluded that "[v]oir dire is grossly ineffective as a screening
mechanism" and that "[j]urors often, either consciously or unconsciously, lie on voir
dire." Id. Further evidence that jurors often fail to be truthful in response to questions
is found in ABA ADVISORY Coeum., supra note 14, at 56-57, 187. The reasons for this lack
of candor may include a desire to serve on the jury, a resistance to exclusion as a reflec-
tion on a juror's ability and good faith, or a reaction to questions posed in an intimidating
or antagonistic manner. Id. at 57; Broeder, supra note 15, at 526.
25. In spite of evidence that unconscious bias is widespread and important, many
courts have resisted recognition of its significance at trial. They prefer to operate on
the assumption that jurors who take an oath to be impartial and who are carefully in-
structed on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof, as well as on their
obligation to decide on the basis of evidence presented at trial, will take their obligation
seriously and abide by their oaths. For an example of a court operating on this assump-
tion, see Commonwealth v. Johnson, 452 Pa. 130, 134-37, 305 A.2d 5, 7-9 (1973). The
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press of the American Bar Association sug-
gests three weaknesses in this position: (1) the adoption of the assumption means
abandonment of the higher standard that a juror should stand indifferent before lie is
sworn; (2) jurors frequently lie or consciously disregard the court's instructions; and (3)
bias may affect a juror's deliberations even though it is not perceived by the juror him-
self. ABA ADVISORY CoMM., supra note 14, at 60-61.
One commentator, see Voir Dire, supra note 15, at 1494-15041, suggests that because of
the increasing awareness of the existence and impact of unconscious bias, the role of the
peremptory and of the challenge for cause should be reexamined. Id. at 1499. He points
out three reasons why challenges for cause should not be used to screen out group
biases and concealed or unconscious prejudices: (1) judges should not be placed in the
position of challenging a juror who asserts his ability to be fair; (2) the detection of
unconcious bias is not sufficiently certain to make it a ground for court-controlled
challenges; (3) basing a challenge for cause on background or group association would
give explicit recognition to the impact of these factors on verdicts and might undermine
popular support for the legal system. Id. at 1500-01. The commentator concludes that
peremptory challenges are an "essential tool" serving a vital function in eliminating
unconscious bias, id. at 1503, 1526, and that increased information is necessary to
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information to make individual judgments about the unconscious
prejudices of prospective jurors,2 6 they tend to act on the basis of
stereotypes and presumptions.2 7  One indicator of unconscious bias
has been group affiliation.2 8 The exercise of the peremptory chal-
facilitate the informed exercise of peremptories: "Greater information about panel
members' attitudes and backgrounds produces less reliance on conventional stereotypes
and more accurate predictions of a juror's receptivity to the party's case." Id. at 1504
(footnote omitted).
26. One reason for this lack of information is the limited extent and content of
questioning allowed at voir dire. Some courts continue to limit voir dire questioning to
the narrow grounds necessary to establish challenges for cause. See People v. Ferlin, 203
Cal. 587, 598, 265 P. 230, 235 (1928), quoted in People v. Rigney, 55 Cal. 2d 236, 244, 359
P.2d 23, 27, 10 Cal. Rptr. 625, 629 (1961) and People v. Crowe, 8 Cal. 3d 815, 830, 506
P.2d 193, 203, 106 Cal. Rptr. 369, 379 (1973); Commonwealth v. Lopinson, 427 Pa. 284, 297,
234 A.2d 552, 560-61 (1967), vacated sub nom. Lopinson v. Pennsylvania, 392 U.S. 647
(1968). The Supreme Court, however, approved questioning intended to form the basis
for peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1965).
Even when appellate courts have not explicitly precluded questioning to elicit grounds
for peremptories, voir dire has been subjected to severe limitations. See, e.g., United
States v. Hamling, 481 F.2d 307, 314 (9th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (trial court's
refusal to question jurors about views toward sex and obscenity was proper in obscenity
prosecution); United States v. Workman, 454 F.2d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 857 (1972) (trial court's refusal to question jurors about attitudes toward drug
use, political activists, and antiwar demonstrators was proper in prosecution of antiwar
demonstrator for assault on policeman and destruction of government property); Maguire
v. United States, 358 F.2d 442, 444-45 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 385 U.S. 801, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 370 (1966) (trial court's refusal to question jurors about bias against homosexuals
was proper, where defense to charge of auto theft was that car owner gave defendants
auto after they had threatened to divulge his homosexuality). But see Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (trial court's refusal to question jurors about racial prej-
udice, in trial of black for possession of marijuana where defense was that police had
framed defendant for his civil rights work, was error); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d
340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973) (rejecting prosecution's argument
that voir dire may be limited to matters falling within challenge for cause); United
States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 380-82 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (trial court's refusal to question
jurors about their attitudes toward self-defense was error). See generally Voir Dire, supra
note 15, at 1504-21.
For proposed guidelines that would extend voir dire questioning, see Racial Prejudice,
supra note 15, at 417-24; Voir Dire, supra note 15, at 1515-26.
27. See M. BLOOMSTEIN, supra note 11, at 64-67; Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, 80
EsquIRE 224 (1973) (originally published in May, 1936); Sutin, The Exercise of Challenges,
44 F.R.D. 286, 289-90 (1967); cf. Kallen, Peremptory Challenges Based Upon Juror Back-
ground-A Rational Use?, 1969 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 143 (results of trial lawyer survey
indicates that while attorneys base their peremptory challenges upon juror background,
there is little agreement among them concerning importance or effect of background).
28. One commentator, see Broeder, supra note 15, at 505-21, relates a series of cases
in which attorneys questioned prospective jurors about their personal and occupational
backgrounds in preparation for the use of peremptories. For further discussion of the
impact of group affiliation on individual attitudes and juror behavior, see E. HILGARD
& R. ATKisoN, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 525-61 (6th ed. 1975) (impact on individual
attitudes); H. TocH, LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSYCHOLOGY 100-09 (1961) (impact on juror
behavior).
Social scientists have been used to aid lawyers in identifying unconscious bias in jurors
in important trials during the last decade. See Etzioni, Science: Threatening the Jury
Trial, Wash. Post, May 26, 1974, § C, at 3, col. 1; Sage, Psychology and the Angela Davis
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lenge on the basis of group affiliation, frequently urged as an ef-
fective trial strategy,29 was recognized and implicitly approved by
the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama.30
In Swain the Court considered a claim that exclusion of blacks
by a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges constituted a denial
of equal protection.31 The prosecutor in Swain had challenged all
six blacks on the venire.3 2 The Court rejected the petitioner's claim
that this action violated the equal protection clause, because "[t]o
subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands
and traditional standards of the equal protection clause would entail
a radical change in the nature and operation of the challenge." 33 The
Jury, HUMAN BEHAVIOR, Jan. 1973, at 56-61; Schulman, Recipe for a Jury, PSYCH. TODAY,
May 1974, at 37-44, 77-84; Zeisel & Diamond, The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans
Conspiracy Trial, 1976 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 151; Zimroth, How They Picked the Panther
21 Jury, 4 JURiS DOCTOR, July 1974, at 38-41.
29. Such advice is offered in litigators' handbooks. See, e.g., ALI-ABA JOINT COMMIT-
TEE ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, TRIAL MANUAL 3 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL
CASES §§ 326-40 (3d ed. 1974); Cohn, The Trial of Criminal Cases, in TRIAL AND TORT
TRENDS: 1967 BELLI SEMINAR 82, 85 (M. Belli ed. 1968).
30. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
31. The petitioner in Swain presented three separate claims. First, he claimed that his
grand jury and his petit jury venire had been selected discriminatorily. The Court held
that the petitioner had not carried his burden of proof with respect to that claim. Id. at
205-09. Second, the petitioner asserted that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
against all six blacks on the venire violated the equal protection clause. The Court held
that no equal protection violation had occurred in the particular trial. Id. at 210, 221-22.
Third, he claimed that the prosecutor had systematically excluded blacks by use of the
peremptory challenge over a period of years. The Court held again that the petitioner
had not carried his burden of proof. Id. at 223-24. See note 36 infra.
In Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the prosecutor peremptorily
challenged nineteen black veniremen and thereby obtained an all-white jury. Rejecting
the defendant's challenge to the jury array, the court said: "[t]he requirements of due
process were met when there was no racial discrimination in the selection of the venire-
men. ... The Constitution does not require that the appellants, being Negroes, should
be tried by a jury composed of or including members of that race." Id. at 164.
Both Swain and Hall were severely criticized when they were decided. For criticism of
Hall, see Note, Constitutionality of Prosecution's Use of Peremptory Challenge to Ex-
clude Negroes from Jury, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 953 (1948); Note, Peremptory Challenging of
Negro Veniremen as Discrimination Against Negro Criminal Defendant, 24 IND. L. REV.
262 (1949); 61 HARv. L. REV. 1455 (1948). For criticism of Swain, see Martin, The Fifth
Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hous. L.
REV. 448 (1966); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 103, 135-39 (1965);
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the
All-White Jury, 52 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1966); Note, Fair Jury Selection Procedures, 75
YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
32. 380 U.S. at 210.
33. Id. at 221-22. The Court suggested that any holding other than denial of the
petitioner's motion would open every challenge to inspection for "reasonableness and
sincerity." Id. at 222. The Court seems to have felt that the peremptory challenge either
must be subject to no form of judicial supervision or must cease to perform its useful
function. The proposal of this Note, however, requires only that an attorney who has
peremptorily challenged a disproportionate number of members of particular groups
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peremptory, the Court wrote, is exercised "on grounds normally
thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the
race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people sum-
moned for jury duty." 34 The presumption was that the prosecutor
challenged members of the group because he believed them more
likely to be partial "in the context of the case to be tried." 35 Although
a violation might be found where the prosecutor demonstrated a sys-
tematic use of challenges against blacks over a period of time, the
presumption could not be overcome by an allegation that the prosecu-
tor removed all blacks from a particular jury or that he removed them
"because they were Negroes.
36
must come forward with nongroup reasons. This proposal would have little or no effect
on the usefulness of the peremptory challenge to eliminate those jurors likely to hold
situation-specific biases. See note 19 supra. The prosecutor and defense attorney would
retain wide discretion so long as they avoided challenges based solely on group associa-
tion. See pp. 1733-40 infra.
34. 380 U.S. at 220 (footnote omitted).
35. Id. at 221.
36. Id. at 222. Justice White, writing for the majority in Swain, stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment claim would take on "added significance" when a prosecutor,
"in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the de-
fendant or the victim may be," peremptorily challenges blacks with the result that no
blacks ever serve on petit juries. Id. at 223. Evidence of persistent exclusion would sup-
port the inference that "Negroes are excluded from juries for reasons wholly unrelated to
the outcome of the particular case on trial and that the peremptory system is being used
to deny the Negro the same right and opportunity to participate in the administration of
justice enjoyed by the white population." Id. at 224. The Court was concerned that the
peremptory challenge system, unlike the systems for selection of veniremen and grand
jurors, involves both prosecutors and defense counsel. Id. at 227. The Court had dif-
ficulty with the record in Swain because it did not show "when, how often, and under
what circumstances" the prosecutor, rather than defense counsel, had been responsible
for precluding black participation on the jury. Id. at 224. Absent a showing of systematic
exclusion through the prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge, the Court was un-
willing to recognize a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 227-28. Justices Harlan
and Black concurred in the result. Id. at 228. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Gold-
berg and Douglas dissented, but on the ground that the record did support the finding
of a systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries. Id. at 237-39 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Swain's systematic exclusion test has proven an insurmountable obstacle to defendants
challenging a prosecutor's exercise of peremptories. No federal court in the decade fol-
lowing Swain, in spite of frequent claims of discrimination, found a violation under that
standard. The difficulties which defendants and courts have encountered stem in part
from the nature of the peremptory and the proof required. Few jurisdictions maintain
comprehensive records of peremptory challenges, and it is difficult if not impossible for
defendants to establish evidence of systematic exclusion by the prosecutor. See United
States v. Nelson, 529 F.2d 40 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976); United States v.
Carter, 528 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v.
Pollard, 483 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974); United States v.
Carlton, 456 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.
1971). Each of these decisions held that the defendant had not carried his burden of
proving systematic exclusion of blacks through the prosecutor's use of the peremptory
challenge. The Eighth Circuit emphasized, however, that the burden imposed by Swain
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Swain thus accepted group association as evidence of a type of par-
tiality which may form the basis for peremptory challenges. Under-
stood in this way, the peremptory may be used to exclude certain
groups from juries. Both prosecutors and defense counsel look to fac-
tors such as sex, race, age, and occupation to identify those jurors
likely to harbor attitudes potentially harmful to their case. Thus the
peremptory can result in members of groups representing distinct
attitudes within the community being eliminated from individual
juries.37 This result and the role of the peremptory challenge gen-
erally must be examined in light of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of trial by an impartial jury selected from a representative cross-
section of the community.38
was "not insurmountable." 528 F.2d at 850. In Carter the court found an 81% rate of
exclusion of blacks, but ruled that it was not excessive where the data represented only
15 trials. Id. at 850. Subsequently, in Nelson, the Eighth Circuit indicated that a con-
tinuation of that same rate of exclusion over a longer period of time would warrant
exercise of the trial court's supervisory power. 529 F.2d at 43.
In United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub norn.
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977), a district court ruled that tile
pattern of government peremptory challenges of blacks over the previous two years had
reached an excessive point that called for the exercise of the court's supervisory power
over the conduct of criminal trials. Id. at 473. The data in Robinson showed that 82
blacks had been included in the final group eligible for jury service, and that the
prosecutor had peremptorily challenged 57 of them-an exclusion rate of 69.5%. In
cases involving white defendants, the exclusion rate was 59.2%; in those involving
minority defendants, it was 84.8%. Id. at 469. Judge Newman termed the overall rate
"substantial" and the rate in cases involving minority defendants "seriously disturbing."
Id. at 472.
The Second Circuit granted the government's petition for mandamus and ruled that
the evidence relied on by the district court was insufficient under Swain. United States
v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit objected to the district
court's reliance on statistics based on trials in both the New Haven and Hartford
Divisions of the District of Connecticut. Separating the data according to the city of
trial, the court found that the actual rate of "inclusion," i.e., the percentage of trials in
which blacks appeared on the final panel and a black juror served on the trial jury, in
New Haven taken alone was 60%, while that in Hartford was 17%. The court did not
comment on the acceptability of the lower rate in Hartford, but vacated the district
court order because the New Haven figure compared favorably with the "expected" rate
of 68%. Id. at 245.
37. Social science evidence has been used by defense counsel to determine jurors'
attitudes. See note 28 supra. In the 1972 Harrisburg Seven case, the defense used its 28
peremptories to eliminate the most prosperous of the prospective jurors. Schulman, supra
note 28, at 42. The defense in the John Mitchell-Maurice Stans conspiracy trial used a
sophisticated sociological study to determine what type of juror would be most likely to
acquit, then used its 20 peremptories to eliminate any juror who did not fall within the
group boundaries. Zeisel and Diamond, supra note 28.
The prosecution, in cases involving black defendants, frequently looks for a juror who
is middle-aged, middle-class, and white, on the assumption that this juror identifies with
the government rather than the defendant. This tendency is evidenced by the cases cited
at notes 3 & 4 supra.
38. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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II. Taylor v. Louisiana: The Sixth Amendment and
Representation of Groups
A. The Representative Cross-Section Standard
A belief that jury composition contributed to their convictions has
long been the basis of challenges by defendants to the impartiality of
their juries.39 Indeed, the Supreme Court has for some time recog-
nized the right of a criminal defendant, in cases involving the super-
visory power of the federal courts, to challenge the exclusion of cer-
tain groups of citizens from federal jury panels.40 Congress, more-
over, has provided that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from service
as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the United States
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic
status,' '41 and that "all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial
by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected at
random from a fair cross section of the community in the district
or division wherein the court convenes. ' 4 2 But it was not until Taylor
v. Louisiana,43 decided in 1975, that the Supreme Court recognized
the Sixth Amendment right of every criminal defendant in state or
federal court to a jury selected from a representative cross-section of
the community. 44
39. For instance, as early as 1879 a black defendant successfully challenged his con-
viction on the ground that blacks had been excluded from jury service by statute.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). For a discussion of the historical back-
ground of challenges to jury selection procedures, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 45-83.
40. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946) (exclusion of women by court
officials); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946) (exclusion of wage earners by
court officials).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1970).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970). Federal law also makes it a crime for any person charged
with the selection of jurors to disqualify a citizen on account of race. 18 U.S.C. § 243
(1970). Cf. ABA PROJEcr, supra note 17, at 46-51 (proposing and discussing requirement
that selection of prospective jurors be made at random from sources providing representa-
tive cross-section of community).
43. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
44. Id. at 530. Prior to Taylor, the cross-sectional idea had been applied as a require-
ment of the Sixth Amendment by a few lower federal courts. E.g., Witcher v. Peyton, 405
F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1969); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 727 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967). Further, the Supreme Court in cases prior to Taylor had
noted in dictum the relationship between the cross-section rule and the Sixth Amend-
ment. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972) (commonsense judgment de-
pends upon jury being "a group of laymen representative of a cross section of the com-
munity"); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (number of jurors should be
large enough "to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section
of the community"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 524 (1968) (opinion of Douglas,
J.) (jury should be impartially drawn from cross-section of community). The Court in
Taylor incorporated into the Sixth Amendment the "unmistakable import" of its prior
opinions. 419 U.S. at 528.
For a thorough history of the cross-sectional idea, see Daughtrey, Cross-Sectionalism in
Jury-Selection Procedures After Taylor v. Louisiana, 43 TENN. L. RaV. 1, 7-82 (1975). Cf.
J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 45-83 (tracing idea of jury impartiality in Supreme Court).
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In Taylor, women had been excluded from jury service by a state
statute which provided that no woman was to be called to a venire
unless she filed a written declaration of her desire to be subject to
jury duty.45 The conceded impact of this statutory scheme was the
virtual exclusion of women from juries in the judicial district where
Taylor was tried.46 Asserting that the " 'broad representative character
of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused
impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration of justice
is a phase of civic responsibility,' 47 the Court approved the male
petitioner's claim that the exclusion of women had deprived him
of the "kind of fact finder to which he was constitutionally entitled." 48
The Taylor Court's Sixth Amendment approach to jury selection is
distinct from the approach of the Swain Court, which reached its de-
cision in response to an alleged denial of equal protection.49 In Swain
the Court was concerned with the proscription of purposeful dis-
crimination: a racial group was not to be systematically excluded from
juries over time by means of peremptory challenges. 50 The rep-
resentative cross-section standard of Taylor, on the other hand, is con-
cerned with a substantive definition of jury impartiality. The jury
is to be drawn from a venire which represents identifiable and sig-
nificant groups within the community.
The Court in Taylor regarded the representation of groups as es-
sential to the impartiality~' and legitimacy52 of the jury system. A
jury that is expected to serve impartially as "the conscience of the
community" 53 should include as widespread a set of community at-
45. 419 U.S. at 523.
46. Id. at 524.
47. Id. at 530-31 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting)).
48. Id. at 526.
49. In a case decided before the Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968),
applied the Sixth Amendment to state court proceedings, the Court rejected a challenge
to an exemption system similar to that involved in Taylor, on the ground that it did not
deny due process or equal protection of the laws because there was a sufficiently rational
basis for the exemption. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62-63 (1961). The Taylor Court
noted that "Hoyt did not involve a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community," and added that "[tlhe right to a proper jury
cannot be overcome on merely rational grounds." 419 U.S. at 534.
50. See note 36 supra.
51. 419 U.S. at 530 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)
('[T]he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained . . .as assurance
of a diffused impartiality ....") (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
52. Id. at 530 ("Community participation . . . is also critical to public confidence in
the fairness of the criminal justice system .... [E]xcluding identifiable segments playing
major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury
trial.")
53. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
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titudes and biases as possible. 54 Although the elimination of jurors
with situation-specific biases is necessary to ensure impartiality in in-
dividual trials, the goal of impartiality is also served by fair repre-
sentation on juries of the various groups in the community. The ex-
clusion of identifiable segments of the community from the venire
deprives the jury of this "diffused impartiality." 5
In Peters v. Kiff56 Justice Marshall stated that
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is
excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human ex-
perience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknow-
able. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will
consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that
its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events
that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
presented.57
54. See 419 U.S. at 530. The Court cited with approval the House Report on the
Federal Jury Selection and Service Act:
It must be remembered that the jury is designed not only to understand the case, but
also to reflect the community's sense of justice in deciding it. As long as there are
significant departures from the cross sectional goal, biased juries are the result-biased
in the sense that they reflect a slanted view of the community they are supposed to
represent.
Id. at 529 n.7 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968)).
55. Id. at 530.
56. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
57. Id. at 503-04. In Peters a white defendant alleged that blacks had been systemat-
ically excluded from his grand and petit juries in a state court. The Court rejected the
state's assertion that the defendant did not have standing to challenge the exclusion of
a class of which he was not a member. Justice Marshall, in an opinion joined by Justices
Goldberg and Stewart, based the holding in the case on the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 498-504 (opinion of Marshall, J.). Justice White, in a
concurring opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Powell, relied on the legislative pur-
pose behind 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1970) (crime for any person charged with selection of jurors
to disqualify citizen on account of race). Id. at 506-07 (opinion of White, J.). The state
argued that
a Negro defendant's right to challenge the exclusion of Negroes from jury service
rests on a presumption that a jury so constituted will be prejudiced against him; that
no such presumption is available to a white defendant; and consequently that a
white defendant must introduce affirmative evidence of actual harm in order to
establish a basis for relief.
Id. at 498. Justice Marshall felt that argument took "too narrow a view of the kinds
of harm that flow from discrimination in jury selection." Id. Discriminatory selection
was unacceptable not only because it offends basic principles of fairness and creates the
appearance of bias, id. at 501-03, but also because it excludes a significant group and
thereby deprives the jury of a unique perspective. The Court held that, "whatever his
race, a criminal defendant has standing to chalenge the system used to select his grand
or petit jury, on the ground that it arbitrarily excludes from service the members of any
race, and thereby denies him due process." Id. at 504. Justice Marshall relied on the due
process clause because the defendant's trial in a state court took place prior to Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). He suggested, however, that if the defendant had been
challenging a post-Duncan jury, the Sixth Amendment would have given him "standing
to challenge the systematic exclusion of any identifiable group from jury service." 407
U.S. at 500.
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According to this view, the outcome of an individual trial may de-
pend upon the attitudes and experiences the various jurors bring to
bear upon the determination of facts and the application of law.5s
The presence of a juror who is a member of a particular group may
make available desired information and may provide a different per-
spective on the community. Those additions may be crucial, because
the course of a jury's deliberations will often depend on the familiarity
of the jurors with all facets of the community and on their willingness
to believe the testimony of particular witnesses and the defendant.o
A representative jury will likely discourage the expression of group
prejudice and ensure that the accused will be tried according to the
same standards as any other member of the community.60
Taylor's suggestion that impartiality results from the interplay of
58. The available studies suggest that a jury's socioeconomic profile is related to the
outcome of its deliberations. The Chicago Jury Project discovered that persons with
higher status jobs, more income, and more education were less likely to acquit by reason
of insanity than were persons of lower socioeconomic status. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY 98-119 (1967). Another study found that jurors of higher socio-
economic status were more likely to return a guilty verdict than were jurors of lower
socioeconomic status. Reed, Jury Deliberations, Voting, and Verdict Trends, 45 Sw. Soc.
Sci. Q. 361, 365-67 (1965). See generally Stephen, Selective Characteristics of Jurors and
Litigants: Their Influences on Juries' Verdicts, in THE JuRY SYSTEM IN AmE.RICA: A
CRITICAL OVERVIEW 95-121 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
The desirability of trial by jury, in the eyes of a defendant, stems primarily from the
possibility that a jury may be more lenient in the application of the law than a profes-
sional judge. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56-62 (1966). The study
showed that a defendant tried before a jury, rather than before a judge, fared better 16%
of the time. Id. at 62 (Table 15). Further, the composition of the jury may determine its
attitude towards the defendant. Juries often respond to their sympathy or dislike for the
accused in resolution of an evidentiary doubt. Id. at 165-66. This is what Kalven and
Zeisel term "the liberation hypothesis": the jurors are "freed" by doubt about the facts
to follow their emotions. The study suggests that juries are lenient more often where they
view the defendant as "sympathetic," and that racial minorities fall disproportionately
into the "unattractive" category. Id. at 211-12 (Tables 65, 66).
59. See Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and
the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 670-73 (1975) (larger juries more likely to be
representative and thus more likely to be familiar with community and receptive to
testimony of particular witnesses and defendant). Cf. Broeder, The Negro ill Court, 1965
DUKE L.J. 19, 30 (reporting case in which ability of black juror to explain why young
black would flee from police even if innocent may have influenced jury's verdict).
60. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972) (opinion of Marshall, J.); Lempert,
supra note 59, at 670. Lempert suggests that a "remark such as 'After all, he's black; lie's
probably committed some other crime if not this one''" might influence jurors who are
uncertain, particularly if made at the end of a long and tiring deliberative process when
a minority may be searching for reasons to change its position. "The possibility of
resolving a difficult decision-making problem by this kind of rationalization might not
occur to some jurors who would assent to the remark if it were made. Or, each juror, so
long as he thinks he alone holds the belief in question, might be reluctant to act on it."
Id. Lempert argues that larger juries are more likely to be representative of the popula-
tion, and that such juries will suppress prejudice and return more reliable and im-
partial verdicts. Id. at 668-73. Cf. Broeder, supra note 59, at 23 (relating case in which
presence of black juror may have offset violent racial prejudice of two white jurors).
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group biases contemplates the representation of certain groups on
venires. But the reasoning in Taylor does not depend upon any as-
sumption that the absence of such a group would necessarily intro-
duce situation-specific bias into the deliberative process. By contrast,
the Court in Witherspoon v. IllinoisOl framed its discussion of group
exclusion in terms of the probability that it would result in situation-
specific bias in the jury room. The contrast provided by the reasoning
in Witherspoon helps clarify the focus of the representative cross-
section standard.
Witherspoon was a capital case in which any venireman who had ex-
pressed qualms about capital punishment had been challenged for
cause. The Court felt that such a jury fell "woefully short" of the
constitutional standard of impartiality with respect to the determi-
nation of punishment.0 2 The Court noted that the state had given
the jury "broad discretion to decide whether or not death is the
'proper penalty' in a given case," and that "a juror's general views
about capital punishment play an inevitable role in any such de-
cision. '0 3 The selection process created the presumption that the
jury had in fact been partial in a specific sense. By excluding all
who expressed scruples against capital punishment, the state had
"crossed the line of neutrality" and produced a jury "uncommonly
willing to condemn a man to die." 64
The crucial point in Witherspoon is that members of the excluded
group of prospective jurors were likely to cast identical votes on a
specific issue. The jury was deprived of its "diffused impartiality"
on the issue of punishment. But the Court explicitly stated that the
same group could be excluded in a case that did not involve capital
punishment, without impinging upon the jury's impartiality. 65 That
result follows from the fact that the excluded group was identifiable
only by reference to the issue of capital punishment. The represen-
61. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
62. Id. at 518.
63. Id. at 519.
64. Id. at 521.
65. The Court was unwilling to conclude "that the exclusion of jurors opposed to
capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt." Id. at 518.
Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, took issue with this position. Couching the issue in
terms of the right to a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the com-
munity, id. at 524, he concluded that "wholesale exclusion" of a class based on their
attitudes toward capital punishment resulted in an "unrepresentative" jury. Id. at 530.
He focused on the necessary interaction of sentencing and determination of guilt. If a
particular community were overwhelmingly opposed to capital punishment, a jury
representing the conscience of that community would choose to avoid the death penalty
by finding guilt of a lesser offense. Id. at 528. But even Justice Douglas's broader reading
would only reach those cases in which capital punishment may be an issue.
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tative cross-section rule, however, focuses on groups that are iden-
tifiable independent of the specific case or issue; such groups may
not be excluded from any jury without endangering its impartiality.
In addition to ensuring an impartial determination of guilt or
innocence, the representative cross-section standard adds to the legit-
imacy of the judicial process in the eyes of the public. The Court
in Taylor stated that community participation in the administration
of the criminal law is "critical to public confidence in the fairness
of the criminal justice system."' 6 Representation of a group on juries
provides the group's members with a sense of participation in the
application of the laws by which they are governed. 67 Denial of jury
participation to distinctive groups, however, can create an appear-
ance of partiality and therefore damage public confidence in the legal
process.
Jury service may also contribute to the preservation of a group's
interests and rights in a community.'s The absence of a group from
petit juries in communities where the group represents a substantial
portion of the population may lead to jury decisionmaking based
on prejudice rather than reason. 69 Exclusion from juries will in-
66. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
67. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the Court emphasized the importance
of trial by jury to the sense of justice and democracy in the criminal system:
[ihe jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a funda-
mental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary
powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges.
Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other
respects, found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community
participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
rd. at 156.
68. The Court's efforts to prevent discrimination in the selection of juries has always
derived in part from the belief that exclusion from juries has a severe impact on the
status of a group in society and on public confidence in the judicial system. For example,
in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), the Court observed that
[t]he very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute
all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their
color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is
practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority,
and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to in-
dividuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
In Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970), the Court validated the right of a
group of black citizens to bring a class action alleging racial discrimination in the
administration of the state's jury-selection laws. The Court found no discrimination on
the record, id. at 337, 339, but cited the language quoted above from Strauder in
emphasizing that exclusion from juries can violate the rights of prospective jurors as
well as defendants. Id. at 329-30. Cf. Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 808-09 (5th Cir. 1975)
(upholding class action claiming that exclusion of blacks and women from jury service
skewed public action in county).
69. For example, a black defendant, faced with an all-white jury, consistently runs a
greater risk of conviction, of conviction of a more severe offense, and of harsher punish-
ment than a white defendant. White jurors, satisfied that blacks will never sit in judg-
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evitably imply official approval of this prejudice and may encourage
disregard for the rights of group members. Furthermore, a group
may be conspicuous by its absence, and such absence may carry with
it pronounced social and personal stigma.To
Jury representativeness is thus a fundamental element of a trial by
one's peers. Taylor's holding that a jury must be selected from a
representative cross-section of the community signifies acceptance by
the Supreme Court of the idea that exclusion of identifiable groups
imperils the fairness and impartiality of the jury process. Further,
group representation on juries adds to the legitimacy of the legal pro-
cess by providing an opportunity for community participation in
government.
B. From Venires to Petit Juries
Taylor was concerned with the exclusion of groups from petit
jury venires. The Court stated that the jury's functions as a "guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power" and as a measure of the
"commonsense judgment of the community" could not be fulfilled if
"large, distinctive groups are excluded from the [jury] pool." 1 Yet
the harm to the defendant and to the jury system that Taylor iden-
tifies results not only from a group's exclusion from venires, but
also from its absence from petit juries. The interplay of group
perspectives and the participation of groups in the judicial process
contemplated by Taylor occurs only at the petit jury level.
The conclusion that the harm identified by Taylor can result from
a group's absence from petit juries compels the extension of Taylor's
reasoning beyond the venire to the jury level. The need for this
extension is further demonstrated by those cases in which prosecu-
tors have been able to exclude racial minorities from juries through
ment upon themselves or their white neighbors, can safely exercise their prejudices. See
J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 333-37 (1959); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 193-218 (1966); Broeder, supra note 59, at 21; Kuhn, Jury Discrimina-
tion: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235, 241-44 (1968); Tucker, Racial Discrimination
in Jury Selection in Virginia, 52 VA. L. REV. 736, 742-45 (1966); Note, The Case for
Blach Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 533-35 (1970).
Juries from which a group has been excluded may also tend to be more lenient toward
persons accused of crimes against members of the excluded group. The bias may result
in part from the natural tendency of individuals to be more concerned with the enforce-
ment of the law and protection of persons in their own sector of the community. But it
may also derive from an unfortunate disregard for the lives and property of minority
groups or from a belief that those groups take a permissive view of crime. See Note,
supra at 534. See generally note 58 supra.
70. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954) (citing stigma that
may result from segregated education).
71. 419 U.S. at 530.
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the exercise of peremptories.7 2 Yet the Court in Taylor explicitly re-
fused to impose any requirement that petit juries "reflect the various
distinctive groups in the population. ' ' 73 There are two reasons that
may account for the Court's reluctance to apply the representative
cross-section standard of Taylor to petit jury composition.
First, jury panels and venires are randomly selected from lists of
qualified jurors.74 Such random selection inevitably results in some
juries that include no members of particular groups represented on
the lists. A requirement that petit juries actually represent each group
in the community would compel court officials to select individual
jurors, a practice that would provide an opportunity for abuse and
an appearance of partiality. Any attempt to require proportionate
representation would also present insurmountable administrative prob-
lems. Selection officials would have to consider the race, sex, age,
income, occupation, educational level, and religion of each juror in
order to ensure that all groups were represented. In addition, the very
process of assigning jurors as representatives of specific groups might
influence the deliberative process by accentuating identifiable dif-
ferences among jurors.
Second, individuals whose situation-specific biases become apparent
at voir dire must be excused for cause. The effect of challenges for
cause might be to remove all members of a particular group from
the jury. Yet to disallow those challenges would leave specifically
biased jurors on the panel. and would introduce actual prejudice
into the trial.
Thus a defendant has no right to a representative jury as stch.
But the reasoning behind Taylor's representative cross-section rule
can be reconciled with the Court's reluctance to extend its analysis
beyond the venire to the jury. The reconciliation can be achieved
by requiring the selection of petit juries in a manner that does not
permit the exclusion of certain groups within the community, except
by means of random selection and the challenging of jurors on the
basis of situation-specific biases. In short, a criminal defendant should
be entitled to a jury from which no such group has been excluded
by the peremptory challenging of prospective jurors on the basis of
their group associations.
72. See notes 3 & 4 supra (citing cases).
73. 419 U.S. at 538.
74. See note 13 supra.
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III. A Proposal for Judicial Control of the
Peremptory Challenge
A. The Limits of the Peremptory Challenge
The purpose of challenges for cause and of peremptory challenges is
to remove individual jurors who may be biased with respect to the
defendant, the prosecution, or the facts of the case. Although per-
emptories are frequently used to exclude identifiable groups from
juries,75 the rationale behind Taylor's representative cross-section rule
suggests that an impartial jury is one in which group biases have
the opportunity to interact. This rationale can be viewed as narrow-
ing the range of permissible grounds for the peremptory challenge.
Group association is evidence not of situation-specific bias,"6 but of
the kind of group bias that Taylor indicates ought to be included
on the jury. Jurors should be challenged as individuals, because
counsel believes that they harbor situation-specific biases. They should
not be challenged because they are members of a group likely to rep-
resent distinctive perspectives within the community. 77
Courts have rarely held that group affiliations are sufficient to
ground a challenge for cause.78 Rather, court-controlled challenges have
75. See notes 3, 4, 27 & 28 supra.
76. See note 19 supra.
77. It may be argued that the exclusion of jurors on the basis of group membership
would be acceptable where it is believed that, for example, blacks are consistently more
biased in favor of acquittal than whites. The argument misses the point of the right to
an impartial jury under Taylor. Blacks may, in fact, be more inclined to acquit than
whites. The tendency might stem from many factors, including sympathy for the
economic or social circumstances of the defendant, a feeling that criminal sanctions are
frequently too harshly applied, or simply an understandable suspicion of the operations
of government. Whites may also be more inclined to convict, particularly of crimes
against a white victim. But these tendencies do not stem from individual biases related
to the peculiar facts or particular party at trial, but from differing attitudes toward the
administration of justice and the nature of criminal offenses. The representation on juries
of these differences in juror attitudes is precisely what the representative cross-section
standard elaborated in Taylor is designed to foster.
One commentator considered the case where exclusion of blacks is justified because
they are consistently more biased in favor of acquittal than whites. He questioned whether
such exclusion is distinguishable from removal of a cab driver venireman from a jury
trying another cab driver for reckless driving. He answered that the cases are distinguish-
able and argues that in the case of the cab driver, the choice for the prosecution is
between a hostile juror and an impartial one. But in the case of a black, a juror presump-
tively sympathetic to the defendant is eliminated in favor of a juror who is presumptively
hostile. Kuhn, supra note 69, at 290-91.
78. These few instances concern narrowly drawn groups. See, e.g., Sims v. United
States, 405 F.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (in prosecution for murder of taxicab driver,
judge should excuse prospective jurors who are, or are related to, taxicab drivers). The
author has found no cases where members of groups defined by race, sex, or economic
class have been successfully challenged on the basis of group affiliation.
Court are likely to presume impartiality despite group affiliations. See Dennis v.
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been restricted to eliminating bias identified during voir dire or in-
ferred from the juror's connection with the case or with the parties.71
Peremptory challenges, on the other hand, frequently are exercised
on the basis of group association."0 The conclusion that the peremp-
tory may not be so exercised effects a significant change in the tradi-
tional understanding of the challenge. That conceptual shift, how-
ever, need not impair the peremptory's effectiveness as a means to
eliminate jurors likely to be biased with respect to the particular case.
Judicial controls can be implemented that will both prevent the
challenging of groups and preserve the potential of the peremptory as
a shield against situation-specific biases.
B. The Elements of a Claim of Exclusion
Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is entitled to
a trial by an impartial jury. The courts have also recognized the state's
interest in prosecutions that are "tried before the tribunal which
the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result." 8'
As the Court stated in Swain, "the view in this country has been that
the system should guarantee 'not only freedom from any bias against
the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution.' "82
Thus both the prosecution and the defense should be allowed to
object to the exclusion of a group by the other party's use of per-
emptory challenges.
A claim of impermissible exclusion should be sustained upon the
United States, 339 U.S. 162 (1950) (in prosecution of General Secretary of Communist
Party of United States for failing to appear before House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee, government employees who stated they could render fair verdict were permitted
to serve as jurors); Richardson v. Communication Workers, 530 F.2d 126, 131 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 77 (1976) (refusing to excuse union members in prosecution of union
officials); Searle v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 203 Mass. 493, 89 N.E. 809 (1909) (trial judge
erred in excusing all Roman Catholics in action involving bishop); State v. Royster, 181
S.C. 269, 186 S.E. 921 (1936) (trial judge erred in excusing all textile workers, in prosecu-
tion arising out of unionization struggle). Cf. Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408,
411-15 (1895) (upholding trial court's refusal to question jurors about their political
affiliations in prosecution for violation of federal election laws).
79. See notes 16 & 17 supra.
80. See notes 3, 4, 27 & 28 supra.
81. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). In Singer the Court upheld the
constitutionality of FED. R. CRUt~. P. 23(a), which requires the consent of the government
and the approval of the court in order for a defendant's waiver of jury trial to be
effective. 380 U.S. at 37.
82. 380 U.S. at 220 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). See United
States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969) (upholding
gag order against defendant). The court in Tijerina said that "[t]he public has an
overriding interest that justice be done in a controversy between the government and
individuals and has the right to demand and expect 'fair trials designed to end in just
judgments.'" Id. at 666 (citations omitted).
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finding of two elements by the court: (1) that the excluded indi-
viduals are members of a "group" for purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment; and (2) that the individual jurors were challenged peremp-
torily on the basis of their group association.
1. Defining Cognizable Groups
The initial problem is to define those groups that should not
be excluded from juries. This Note will refer to these groups as "cog-
nizable."8 3 In cases involving exclusion from jury pools or venires,
federal and state courts have upheld claims of groups defined by
race,84 sex, 5 national originSG religion,8 7 age,88 economic status,8 9 and
occupation.) Such recognition has not been consistent,91 however,
and most decisions offer little guidance beyond the particular cir-
cumstances of each case. But the problem of group definition is in-
escapable, and the courts are in need of defining guidelines. General
guidelines may be derived from the rationale behind the represen-
tative cross-section requirement of Taylor.
The first goal of the Taylor rule is to ensure jury impartiality
83. In cases involving exclusion from jury pools and venires, the courts have referred
to groups as "identifiable," see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Peters v.
Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954), "large [and]
distinctive," see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975), and "cognizable," see
United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d 1145, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Test, 399
F. Supp. 683, 688 (D. Colo. 1975); United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298, 306
(E.D. La. 1973); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d
1265 (2d Cir. 1972). "Cognizable" is the most appropriate term to describe those groups
which courts recognize for Sixth Amendment purposes.
84. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
85. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
86. See United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392, 398 (D.V.I. 1953)
(persons of Puerto Rican descent); State v. Plenty Horse, 85 S.D. 401, 184 NAV. 2d 654
(1971) (American Indians).
87. See Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Crim. 297, 277 SMW. 1091 (1925) (Roman Catholics).
88. See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1970) (persons 21-34 years
old).
89. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223 (1946) (daily wage earners); Smith
v. Yeagar, 465 F.2d 272, 275 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972) (dictum) (mem-
bers of any economic class); Carmical v. Craven, 457 F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 1971) (persons
from low-income neighborhoods); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 719-24 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (daily wage earners).
90. See Simmons v. State, 182 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1966) (manual laborers).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Gooding, 473 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1973) (Cuban-Americans
becoming eligible for jury service within three years prior to trial not a cognizable
group); United States v. Gast, 457 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1972) (young people who choose
not to vote not cognizable); United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. La.
1973) (poor people not cognizable group); United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140
(S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972) (young people not cognizable). For a general
survey of the courts' treatment of various groups, see J. VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 45-83.
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through the interplay of group biases in the jury system.92 In finding
that women could not be excluded from the venire in Taylor, the
Court noted that " 'the two sexes are not fungible,' " and that " 'a
flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.' -3 In Peters
v. Kiff Justice Marshall warned that the effect of group exclusion is
"to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience."9 4 These observations suggest that
certain characteristics of groups imbue their members with unique
perspectives on events. The representation of diverse perspectives in
the jury room contemplated by Taylor can be ensured if courts recog-
nize groups defined in terms of characteristics likely to lead to shared
perspectives among group members. A cognizable group defined in
this manner need not include only individuals who share a given
perspective; nor need the group include all the individuals who share
that perspective. But the bulk of the group's members should share
a perspective within the community that cannot adequately be rep-
resented if the group is excluded.9 5
Taylor's representative cross-section requirement is designed not
only to ensure the impartiality of the deliberative process, but also
to enhance the legitimacy of the judicial process in the eyes of the
public. The latter goal requires that the community not perceive
any identifiable group as excluded from petit juries. Commonly recog-
nized community groups should, therefore, be represented. The iden-
tification of these groups will depend both on the demography of
the community and on the perceptions of its citizens. Groups pecu-
liarly subject to discrimination within the community should be
viewed with special consideration.9"
A cognizable group can thus be defined in terms of any identifiable
group characteristic that results in its members sharing distinctive
experiences and perspectives.97 The defining characteristic should
92. See pp. 1726-28 supra.
93. 419 U.S. at 531-32 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946)).
94. 407 U.S. at 503-04.
95. See United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.), a!I'd, 468 F.2d 1245
(2d Cir. 1972) (stating that group, to be cognizable, should have, inter alia, "a basic
similarity in attitudes or ideas or experience which is present in members of the group
and which cannot be adequately represented if the group is excluded from the jury
selection process").
96. Members of such groups may be further disadvantaged by the group's absence
from juries, and the fact of discrimination suggests the group is commonly recognized
and possesses a unique perspective within the community. Cf. United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that prejudice against "discrete and
insular" minorities may call for especially "searching judicial inquiry").
97. This definition is to be distinguished from those which might be used to identify
groups in an equal protection context. For example, Professor Owen Fiss has suggested
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clearly identify any individual as within or without a group's mem-
bership. 8 Objective characteristics such as race and sex suggest them-
selves as both precise and easily administrable.99
The fact that a group is distinct from the rest of the community
and that its members possess unique experiences and attitudes argues
for the group's representation on juries. Further, the community's
perception of it as a group makes its representation important to the
legitimacy of the jury system. But the crucial questions are whether
a member of the group will possess a distinctive outlook because he
shares the characteristic that defines the group, and whether other
members of the community are capable of representing that perspec-
tive on petit juries. The answers are likely to depend upon a court's
judgments about the impact that certain characteristics and social
positions have on a group's members. For instance, the size of a group
may be important in determining whether exclusion of its members
would deprive the jury of a perspective crucial to the formulation
of a community verdict.' 00
As the Court wrote in Taylor, "[c]ommunities differ at different
times and places. What is a fair cross section at one time or place is
not necessarily a fair cross section at another time or a different
place."''1 Population statistics, samplings of group attitudes, testimony
of local citizens, and social science evidence may be relevant to the
that in the equal protection context a "social group" is defined by, among other factors,
its members' interdependence: "the identity and well-being of the members" are linked,
and they identity themselves "by reference to their membership in the group." Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY AND PUB. AFF. 107, 148 (1976). In-
terdependence is crucial if one is concerned with protection of a group, but it may not be
necessary in the jury representation area, where the courts are also concerned with what
a group's members bring to the jury room. For example, the well-being of an individual
woman may not necessarily be linked to that of other women, but she is nonetheless likely
to share a perspective peculiar to her sex. Thus, whatever their status with respect to the
equal protection clause, women clearly constitute a group under the present analysis.
98. See United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d
1245 (2d Cir. 1972).
99. In United States v. McDaniels, 370 F. Supp. 298, 307 (E.D. La. 1973), the court
felt that the category of "poor" people was not subject to definition in the same fashion
as race, religion, sex, or national origin because the defining characteristic was too much
a matter of degree. A court such as that in McDaniels, while unwilling to recognize poor
people as a cognizable group, might be more willing to recognize manual laborers or
daily wage earners. See Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 719-24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 991 (1967). Occupational or educational groups may be more easily identifiable,
and they may in some instances serve as adequate substitutes for income- or age-defined
groups.
100. Compare United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213, 1217 n.4 (9th Cir. 1972) with
United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1970) (Ross relies on smallness of class
of young people from twenty-one to twenty-four to distinguish Blutera, which held
twenty-one to thirty-four year olds cognizable).
101. 419 U.S. at 537.
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substantiation of a group's cognizability within a community. 10 2 Gen-
erally, groups defined by race and sex are clearly identifiable and
likely to share a distinctive perspective. Other groups, including those
defined by age, economic status, national origin, occupation, or re-
ligion may be treated with more flexibility.103 The burden should
be on the party objecting to demonstrate that the excluded jurors
are members of a cognizable group.
04
2. Finding a Violation: Group-Based Peremptories
Requiring representation of all community groups on juries would
undermine the peremptory's usefulness in removing specifically biased
jurors. 05 Objections to a party's use of peremptory challenges should
therefore be sustained only where the peremptories have been exer-
cised on the basis of group association. Individual peremptories should
be presumed to have been exercised for situation-specific reasons.' 00
That presumption should be overcome only when it is established that
a party has used its challenge to exclude a disproportionate number
of jurors who are members of a cognizable group.
0 7
102. Such evidence has been found acceptable in other contexts. See, e.g., Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.11 (1954) (Court relied upon social science findings
in school desegregation context); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) ("testimony
of responsible officials and citizens" used to substantiate existence of community prej-
udice).
103. Drawing on an example suggested above, see note 77 supra, taxicab drivers would
not be a cognizable group under these guidelines. The group is clearly identifiable, but
the group is likely to be neither large enough to constitute a significant segment of the
community nor sufficiently distinct in its experience that its outlook could not be
represented adequately by others.
104. Otherwise, counsel for the defendant or the prosecution might be tempted to
make life difficult for his adversary by objecting and forcing opposing counsel to come
forward with evidence that the challenged jurors do not constitute a cognizable group.
105. See p. 1732 supra.
106. This presumption preserves the wide discretion of the prosecutor and defense
attorney. See notes 19 & 33 supra. They will be subject to no limitation on that discre-
tion until the other party has carried its burden in overcoming this presumption.
107. The test proposed here is similar to that used in equal protection cases where
the composition of venires is in question. The general practice has been to require a
twofold showing by the defendant: first, a significant disparity between the proportion
of the group in the population and its representation on jury panels; second, a showing
that the disparity originated, at least in part, at some point in the selection process
where state officials invoked their subjective judgment rather than objective and
racially neutral criteria.
Early venire cases were easy, for they asserted total or virtually total exclusion of
blacks in a community in which blacks represented a substantial minority. See, e.g.,
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954);
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris v. Alabama, 29-
U.S. 587 (1935). More recent cases, however, have posed the problem of determining the
degree of exclusion that is unacceptable and the procedures that are discriminatory. See
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Akins v.
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When an objection is raised, the court should examine the "rate
of exclusion" of the group. This percentage figure is arrived at by
dividing the number of group members challenged peremptorily by
the allegedly offending party by the number of group members on
the venire (or on that part of the venire from which the jury has
been chosen) who have not been successfully challenged for cause.
This figure should be compared with the rate that would be expected
were challenges exercised independent of group association. The latter
percentage, the "expected rate of exclusion," is arrived at by dividing
the number of peremptory challenges available to the allegedly of-
fending party by the number of members of the venire (or of that
part of the venire from which the jury has been chosen) who have
not been challenged for cause. s08 If the actual rate of exclusion is
significantly larger than the expected rate, a presumption should
be raised that group association was the basis for the challenges. 1°9
When a court finds that a party's use of its peremptories has re-
sulted in disproportionate exclusion of a cognizable group, a prima
Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). In each of these cases, the Court suggested that the prima facie
rule was applicable, but either rejected the significance of the statistical disparity or
accepted the explanation of the government.
For federal cases in which a prima facie case of discrimination has been found- on
the basis of underrepresentation, see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (ruling
that prima facie case of discrimination was made out where 21% of eligible population
was Negro, but 14% of pool, 7% of list, and 5% of venire were Negro, and where selec-
tion procedures themselves were shown not to be racially neutral); Whitus v. Georgia,
385 U.S. 545 (1967) (reversing conviction where Negroes represented 42% of eligible
population, 27% of taxpayers from whom jury lists were drawn, and only 9% of lists
themselves); Smith v. Yeagar, 465 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972) (6% of grand jury Negro com-
pared with 25% of population); Witcher v. Peyton, 405 F.2d 725 (4th Cir. 1969) (25% of
population nonwhite, 8% of jury list); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967) (Negroes constituted 25.8% of eligible population, an
average of 6.2% of venires).
108. For an example comparison, if there are 48 jurors on the venire not challenged
for cause and the party has six peremptory challenges, the expected rate of exclusion
would be one in eight, or 12.5%. If the party challenged peremptorily four of the five
blacks on the venire not challenged for cause, the actual rate of 80% would be compared
with the 12.5% figure.
109. For an example of a court using a rate of exclusion test in a jury discrimination
case, see United States v. Robinson, 421 F. Supp. 467 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated sub nor.
United States v. Newman, 549 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). The court in Robinson relied
upon the rate of exclusion of black jurors by peremptory challenge over a two-year
period to find a violation under the Swain "systematic exclusion" test. See note 36 supra.
If the prosecutor's challenges in Robinson had been exercised without regard to race, he
would have been expected to strike, on the average, 21.4% of any one racial group.
Figures three and four times that rate suggested to the court that the prosecutor was
challenging on the basis of membership in a racial group. 421 F. Supp. at 469-71. The
Second Circuit objected not to the use of the exclusion rate as a measure of discrimina-
tion, but to the accuracy and adequacy of the statistics actually used. 549 F.2d at 243-50.
For a discussion of the application of statistical probability theory to jury discrimina-
tion cases, see Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury
Discrimination Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 339 (1966).
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facie case is established. This should shift the burden to the al-
legedly offending party to show that its challenges were not exercised
on the basis of group association. This burden may be carried by
offering reasons for individual challenges which are not related to
group associations. These reasons need not be sufficient to ground
a challenge for cause. They should appear, however, to have been
applied consistently to similarly situated jurors of other groups, and
they should be reasonably relevant to the particular trial or to non-
group characteristics of the parties or witnesses." 0 The court should
be prepared to consider whether the reasons are contrived to avoid
admitting that peremptories were based on group association."'
The proposal outlined here contemplates cases in which the al-
legedly offending party will be required to justify its peremptory chal-
lenges or be subjected to some penalty. The threatened application of
a penalty would deter continued use of group association as a basis
for the peremptory challenge. In cases involving improper selection
of jury venires, the venire is generally discharged and a new one
selected according to constitutional procedures."12 This would also
be necessary in cases involving abuse of the peremptory challenge.
Merely selecting a new venire, however, while it would set right the
harm to the particular defendant or his prosecution, would have
little deterrent value. The offending party could simply take the
chance that no objection would be raised; if the gamble fails, the
party has lost nothing but the time involved in recommencing the
selection process.
Hence, where a party is found to have exercised its peremptory
challenges on the basis of group association, that party should for-
feit all or a proportion of the challenges that were used against
members of the cognizable group in the original venire."13 The
threat of forfeiture of peremptory challenges would deter a party
contemplating the use of peremptory challenges based on group as-
sociations. The party would be encouraged to consider what non-
110. There may, for example, be instances where a particular fact regarding a prospec-
tive juror has not been deemed sufficient to show "cause." An attorney might then
challenge the juror peremptorily, either for that same reason (e.g., that he or she is a
cab driver and the victim was also a cab driver) or because he is afraid the juror was
antagonized by vigorous voir dire questioning or by the attempt to challenge him for
cause.
111. If, for example, an attorney were to challenge three blacks and then offer as
reasons that one was too tall, another too talkative, and another too short, a court
might be justified in rejecting these reasons. The court's observations during voir dire
questioning should be helpful in guiding its decision.
112. See ABA PROJECT, supra note 17, at 61-62.
113. Where the number of peremptory challenges to be granted to a party is prescribed
by statute, forfeiture of challenges may require a statutory amendment.
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group reasons it could successfully offer for having eliminated a par-
ticular juror. Such increased consideration of individual jurors would
not only diminish reliance on group affiliation, but would also result




The Court in Swain v. Alabama held that the peremptory chal-
lenging of blacks in a particular case did not violate the equal pro-
tection clause. In doing so, the Court implicitly approved peremptory
challenges based on group affiliations of prospective jurors. Subse-
quently, in Taylor v. Louisiana, the Court reaffirmed the principle that
juries should be drawn from a representative cross-section of the com-
munity. Swain's concern for the traditional function of the peremp-
tory challenge can be reconciled with Taylor's concern for group
representation in the jury system. The proposal of this Note at-
tempts to strike the proper balance between the peremptory challenge
as a method by which to remove situation-specific bias and the reason-
ing behind Taylor. The proposal is suitable for adoption by courts
or by legislatures, including Congress, when revising their rules of
criminal procedure.
Adoption of this proposal should be accompanied by a reexamina-
tion both of the effects of the peremptory challenge and of the scope
of voir dire questioning. An empirical evaluation of the effect of
peremptory challenges on jury impartiality, in light of their potential
use to exclude cognizable groups, is essential to determine whether
the challenge should be preserved. Similarly, it might be found ad-
visable to expand the scope of voir dire questioning so that attorneys
can exercise peremptory challenges on a more informed and in-
dividualized basis.
114. Where the defendant objects to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
at trial and the court rejects the Sixth Amendment claim, the issue should present a
valid ground for appeal from a conviction. As in other jury discrimination cases, if the
appellate court finds that the trial court erred in overruling the objection the defendant
should be granted a new trial. Double jeopardy would prevent the prosecution from
appealing an acquittal, even where it had raised a timely objection to the defendant's
use of peremptory challenges. See United States v. Burroughs, 289 U.S. 159, 161 (1933);
United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312 (1892).
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